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General Richard B. Myers became the fifteenth chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 October 2001. In this capac-
ity, he serves as the principal military adviser to the presi-
dent, the secretary of defense, and the National Security
Council. Prior to becoming chairman, he served as vice
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for nineteen months.
General Myers was born in Kansas City, Missouri. He is
a 1965 graduate of Kansas State University and holds a
master’s degree in business administration from Auburn
University. The general has attended the Air Command
and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama;
the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Penn-
sylvania; and the Program for Senior Executives in Na-
tional and International Security at the John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University.
General Myers entered the Air Force in 1965 through the
Reserve Officer Training Corps program. His career in-
cludes operational command and leadership positions in
a variety of Air Force and joint assignments. General
Myers is a command pilot with more than 4,100 flying
hours in the T-33, C-37, C-21, F-4, F-15, and F-16, in-
cluding six hundred combat hours in the F-4.
As the vice chairman from March 2000 to September
2001, General Myers served as the chairman of the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, as vice chairman of the
Defense Acquisition Board, and as a member of the Na-
tional Security Council Deputies Committee and the
Nuclear Weapons Council. In addition, he acted for the
chairman in all aspects of the Planning, Programming,
and Budgeting System, including participation in the
Defense Resources Board.
From August 1998 to February 2000, General Myers was
Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace De-
fense Command and U.S. Space Command; Com-
mander, Air Force Space Command; and Department of
Defense manager for space transportation system contin-
gency support at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. As
commander, General Myers was responsible for defend-
ing America through space and intercontinental ballistic
missile operations. Prior to assuming that position, he
was Commander, Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force
Base, Hawaii, from July 1997 to July 1998. From July
1996 to July 1997 General Myers served as assistant to
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Pentagon;
and from November 1993 to June 1996 he was Com-
mander of U.S. Forces Japan and Fifth Air Force at
Yokota Air Base, Japan.
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SHIFT TO A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
General Richard B. Myers, U.S. Air Force
In ancient India, six blind men encountered an elephant for the first
time and quickly began to squabble about the nature of elephants;
The first blind man bumped into the elephant’s side and declared that
the beast was like a wall;
The second, discovering the ear, concluded it was like a fan;
The third blind man came across the tail and thought the elephant to
be very much like a rope;
The fourth, encountering the elephant’s leg, was sure the animal resem-
bled a tree;
Finding the tusk, the fifth blind man proclaimed the elephant to be like
a spear;
And the sixth, grasping the elephant’s trunk, concluded the giant pachy-
derm most resembled a snake.
We all know from the ancient Oriental story of the six blind men and theelephant that how we perceive something determines our understanding
of it and, by implication, our response to it. With that in mind, the U.S. military
must shift from a regional to a global view of our security environment in order
to understand and respond better. In the past, America’s security needs were
served adequately by having its uniformed leaders in Washington maintain the
global vision, while the majority of U.S. military organizations maintained a re-
gional or functional focus. However, to provide effectively for the nation’s de-
fense in the twenty-first century, we must all come to understand and appreciate
the global perspective.
Examining trends in the global security environment and the ways in which
the U.S. military has organized to deal with past challenges provides the founda-
tion for understanding the implications for America’s armed forces today, as we
transform our military into one that is ready to provide effective missile defense,
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information operations (IO), space operations, and other capabilities that do
not respect our traditional regional boundaries.
TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
During the last decade of the twentieth century, we witnessed dramatic shifts in
the global security environment. Revolutionary technological advances and mon-
umental political changes rendered our world safer in some ways, though less pre-
dictable and arguably less stable. While students of international affairs have
debated the broader meaning and impact of globalization, defense professionals
have worked to understand the security implications of these global trends.
Technological changes since 1990 have occurred at an extraordinary pace.
Consider for a moment where you were and what you were doing as the Berlin
Wall came down. How many people at that time owned a cellular phone or a per-
sonal computer, had logged onto the Internet, or knew what a global positioning
satellite system was? Whereas television news coverage of the Vietnam War took
thirty-six to forty-eight hours to reach American viewers, stories of the Gulf War
were broadcast around the world instantaneously. During the Gulf War, the Ca-
ble News Network was unique in providing continuous coverage of global news.
Now, several major networks in the United States provide coverage of global
events as they happen, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a
year—not to mention the variety of international news programs produced and
broadcast by foreign broadcast corporations. Al-Jazeera provides programming
that shapes perceptions of the United States in much of the Arabic-speaking
world. Imagery satellites capable of better than one-meter resolution were the
sole purview of superpowers but are now operated by companies in the United
States and Europe for the benefit of whoever is willing to pay for the images. In
August 2002, commercial satellite images of airfields in the Horn of Africa were
broadcast around the world, allegedly showing potential staging areas for at-
tacks against Iraq. For those who missed the news, the satellite photographs were
available on the Internet.
The political changes in the 1990s were no less staggering. As a fighter pilot, I
spent the first twenty-five years of my Air Force career studying Soviet fighter
aircraft that NATO would have had to confront in deadly combat if the Cold War
ever heated up. Now Soviet fighters that could be seen in the West only in classi-
fied photos are performing at air shows over America’s heartland. Today, officers
from the former Soviet Union pursue professional military education at our
staff colleges and war colleges, and three former Warsaw Pact states have joined
NATO. The end of the Cold War lowered the threat of nuclear Armageddon and
brought an end to many of the proxy wars through which the two sides struggled
to exert their influence. But the Cold War imposed on international affairs a
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certain element of stability and predictability that no longer exists. There is an
alarming number of customers—including states and nonstate actors—seeking
to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, includ-
ing long-range ballistic missiles. In short, the technological and political
changes that have improved our quality of life and brought us all closer together
can also be perverted to empower those who would do us harm.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
As we chart our way ahead, we do not begin with a clean sheet of paper. We must
first understand how we arrived at our current way of organizing for national se-
curity if we are to understand why we are better off organizing functionally or
globally for some mission areas rather than relying entirely on regional combat-
ant commands. At the same time, we should appreciate, not abandon, the value
of regional expertise in implementing our national security strategy and na-
tional military strategy.
The experiences of the Second World War and early Cold War helped to dis-
pel lingering illusions about America’s security and its proclivity for isolation-
ism; those experiences drew America’s new international responsibilities into
tighter focus. Responding to America’s changed role in the world, Congress
passed the National Security Act of 1947, creating the National Security Coun-
cil, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense. While Con-
gress legislated the overarching security structure, President Harry S. Truman
established the first Unified Command Plan (UCP), creating our regional and
functional combatant commands. Among these newly created commands were
U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM),
U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM), and the Strategic Air Command
(SAC). The containment policy our armed forces helped to support was a global
one, but there was arguably little need for our regional commanders to focus
globally. In any case, the regional commanders lacked the technological means
to gain and maintain a global perspective.
The first Unified Command Plans merely codified the command structures
that existed at the end of the Second World War. What had once been General
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s command became USEUCOM; General Douglas
MacArthur’s command became Far East Command; and Admiral Chester
Nimitz’s command became USPACOM. There were other regional commands
with responsibilities for Alaska, for the Caribbean, and for guarding the north-
eastern air approaches to the United States, but there were also vast areas of the world
not assigned to any combatant command.1 When our first combatant commands
were established, the service chiefs played an active role in the commands and
served as the Joint Chiefs of Staff ’s executive agents in overseeing the commands.
M Y E R S 1 1
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From the outset of the Cold War, regional commands focused on their re-
gions while the Joint Chiefs of Staff kept a global perspective. Although this ar-
rangement served the nation well enough to see us through the Cold War, there
were signs of trouble as early as 1951, when President Truman dismissed General
MacArthur in the midst of the Korean War. After serving as Chief of Staff of the
Army in the 1930s, MacArthur had lived in Asia until his dismissal by President
Truman in 1951. He first served as military adviser to the Philippine govern-
ment. Then, during the Second World War, he was made commander of U.S.
troops in the southwest Pacific area. After the war, MacArthur became military
governor of Japan, overseeing its occupation and reconstruction. With the out-
break of the Korean War, General MacArthur’s Far East Command provided the
U.S. underpinning to the United Nations war effort. In response to MacArthur’s
protest against limited objectives in the Korean War—“no substitute for vic-
tory”—the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley, in-
formed Congress that he and the Joint Chiefs unanimously agreed that in the
global struggle against communism, a wider war in Asia represented “the wrong
war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.”2 Though
partly a clash over the utility of limited objectives in war, the disagreement
largely reflected the two sides’ differing perspectives—MacArthur’s Asia-centric
regional perspective and the Joint Chiefs’ global perspective, which had to ac-
count for Europe as well as Asia.
In the fifty-six years since the first Unified Command Plan, our combatant
command structure has been expanded geographically and empowered legally.
The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act strengthened the role
of our combatant commands, and with UCP ’02, the last remaining unassigned
regions of the world—Russia, the Caspian Sea, Antarctica, and the countries of
North America—were finally placed within our combatant commanders’ areas
of responsibility (AORs). Now the entire globe is encompassed within the AORs
of our five regional combatant commands—U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Pacific Com-
mand (USPACOM), U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and U.S.
Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM).
In addition to regional combatant commands, the United States has had
functional combatant commands since the inception of the UCP. In fact, Strate-
gic Air Command was technically the first, formally becoming a combatant
command just two weeks before USPACOM, USEUCOM, and USLANTCOM.
Still, today’s functional unified combatant commands are relatively recent
creations that began with the establishment of U.S. Space Command
(USSPACECOM) in 1985.3 In the decade and a half that followed, successive ad-
ministrations established U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM),
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U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), U.S. Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM), and U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). The rise of
these functional commands highlights the reality that some military missions or
responsibilities can be better fulfilled by carving out functions from our re-
gional commands’ responsibilities than by having the functions dispersed
among our regional commands.
The newly established USSTRATCOM—formed by joining the capabilities
and resources of USSPACECOM and the original USSTRATCOM—is taking on
some missions that had been unassigned previously and that overlap the re-
sponsibilities of our regional combatant commands. USSTRATCOM’s nuclear
focus broadened considerably with the latest Nuclear Posture Review (NPR),
signed by the secretary of defense in December 2001. In addition to specifying
the road ahead for America’s nuclear arsenal, the 2001 NPR also introduced a
new strategic triad. The old triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles,
long-range bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles has given way
to a triad of strategic offensive capabilities, strategic defenses, and the infra-
structure and research and development needed to sustain America’s strategic
capabilities. Strategic offensive capabilities include nonnuclear, even
nonkinetic, strikes as well as traditional nuclear force employment. As described
in the NPR, the new triad is enabled by command and control (C2), intelligence,
and planning capabilities. The president’s decision to combine USSPACECOM
and USSTRATCOM to form a new U.S. Strategic Command was a major step in
fulfilling the vision for a new strategic triad. Despite its familiar name, the new
command is as different from the former USSTRATCOM as it is from the former
USSPACECOM. It is an entirely new command—and greater than the sum of its
two predecessors. Obviously, the new USSTRATCOM will have global responsi-
bilities, and its commander and staff must have a global perspective for dealing
with threats to U.S. security.
USSOCOM has also been given new responsibilities and a greater role in the
global war on terrorism. The very expression “global war on terrorism” high-
lights the global approach needed for dealing with the problem of terrorism. At
the first Defense Department press conference of 2003, the secretary of defense
announced the change of focus at USSOCOM, pointing out that “Special Oper-
ations Command will function as both a supported and a supporting com-
mand.”4 In the past, USSOCOM has, with very few exceptions, been the
supporting command to our regional combatant commands. Obviously, terror-
ist networks today have a global presence, with members and cells around the
world, and we can no longer adequately counter the scourge of terrorism by rely-
ing solely on regional strategies. We also need a global approach to the problem.
M Y E R S 1 3
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. MILITARY
The establishment of a new USSTRATCOM and an expanded role for
USSOCOM does not come at the expense of our regional combatant com-
mands. This is not a zero-sum equation. Our regional combatant commands
provide essential regional expertise; they provide an enduring basis for U.S.
presence around the globe; they are the keys to successful theater security coop-
eration with our allies and friends; and they provide the basis for pursuing mul-
tinational interoperability and military coalitions. In peace and in war, our
regional combatant commands provide direction to, and C2 over, U.S. military
activities around the world. The challenge for our armed forces today is to bal-
ance these regional responsibilities with the need to address missions that are
global in nature.
Whether we divide our combatant commanders’ responsibilities and author-
ities along functional lines and address them on a global basis or instead choose
to deal with them along regional lines, we create “seams.” Seams—that is, the dis-
continuities where one command’s responsibilities end and another’s begin—
are unavoidable, unless we take the impractical step of making one commander
responsible for everything, everywhere, all the time. However, seams can be-
come vulnerabilities that our adversaries might exploit. Therefore, when organiz-
ing our combatant commands, we strive to place seams where it makes the most
sense to place them—where they provide us the greatest effectiveness and efficien-
cies and present our adversaries with the least opportunity to do us harm.
Missions that cross all regional boundaries require a global approach. One
of those is computer network defense. Electrons do not respect geographic
boundaries, and requiring each of our geographic commands to plan inde-
pendently for protecting computer networks would create unacceptable
seams. Recognizing this, we assigned the lead for computer network defense to
USSPACECOM in 1999. This assignment of a global mission to a commander
with a global perspective was a precursor of the new missions assigned to the
new USSTRATCOM.
Many inherently global military mission areas are of increasing importance
to our security and cannot be addressed well from a regional perspective. Mili-
tary mission areas that are inherently global include the following: integrating
missile defense across areas of responsibility; certain elements of information
operations; space operations; global strike operations; certain intelligence, sur-
veillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities associated with global strike, mis-
sile defense, IO, and space operations; and countering terrorism.
Missile defense is a responsibility of all of our regional combatant com-
mands. However, no regional combatant command, even the newly established
USNORTHCOM, is better suited than any other to integrate missile defense
1 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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operations across AORs in support of the president’s stated goal of providing
protection for the U.S. deployed forces, allies, and friends. When missiles in a
distant theater can be used against targets anywhere on the globe, the United
States needs global ISR and global command and control to integrate its missile
defense capabilities—which, by the way, include offensive capabilities to pre-
empt or prevent missile attacks. We cannot afford to think of missile defense
merely in terms of actively intercepting missiles after they have been launched.
Certain elements of information operations similarly require a global per-
spective and better integration of our nation’s capabilities. While information
operations should become a core warfighting capability of all of our combatant
commands, certain IO activities could create effects of such a magnitude that fo-
cusing on regional consequences would be unnecessarily restrictive and ulti-
mately unhelpful. Even when the effects of information operations are limited to
a single area of operations, a global perspective will be needed to ensure that the-
ater IO is compatible with IO in other AORs. A global perspective will often pro-
vide the essential starting point for success, whether we are attempting to get a
message across to an adversarial audience that spans more than one theater, con-
ducting electronic warfare activities to inhibit long-distance communications,
performing computer network operations, or carrying out military deception
programs. Even within a single theater, USSTRATCOM will provide “value
added” to the regional combatant commands by integrating efforts that have
previously tended to be “stovepiped” in different organizations (e.g., C2 warfare,
psychological operations, electronic warfare, computer network attack).
Space operations present another military mission area where a regional fo-
cus is inadequate and a global perspective is needed. Given the vital role space
operations play in global communications, one cannot always determine pre-
cisely where space operations end and information operations begin. In the past,
the supported-supporting relationships between regional combatant com-
mands and U.S. Space Command were predominantly one-way, with
USSPACECOM supporting the regional commands. In the future, we are much
more likely to see regional commands supporting the new USSTRATCOM to
ensure the success of military operations in space. This change in roles will re-
quire our regional combatant commands to develop a deeper appreciation for
the global perspective of America’s security needs.
Given the nature of threats facing America in the twenty-first century, in-
cluding fleeting targets, such as mobile ballistic missiles or leaders of terrorist
networks, we must develop the ability to undertake appropriate military action
rapidly anywhere on the globe. Such action could be taken by today’s long-range
bombers, shipborne weapon systems, or special forces, but new global capabili-
ties will be needed in the future. Regional combatant commands could play
M Y E R S 1 5
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supported or supporting roles in global strike operations, depending on the sce-
nario and weapon systems involved. However, one need look no farther than our
current global war on terrorism to appreciate the need for a global perspective in
planning for and prosecuting global military operations.
Global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities will be needed
for gathering indications-and-warning data and otherwise to enable global
strike, space operations, certain elements of IO, and integrated missile defense.
Moreover, global C2 capabilities are needed to enable integrated global missile
defense, facilitate global strike, integrate regional operations with global opera-
tions, and integrate regional operations in one area of operations with those of
another. Knitting together various regionally focused ISR activities is unlikely to
yield a coherent global perspective. Simply put, a relevant global perspective
cannot be obtained without ISR activities that are, to some degree, globally co-
ordinated and directed—a function the Defense Intelligence Agency performs.
What is new is that given the low-density/high-demand nature of many of our
ISR resources, regional combatant commands are more likely than before to be
required to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities in
support of global operations tasked to USSOCOM or USSTRATCOM.
Often discussions about the need to shift from a regional focus to a global per-
spective lead to debates about supported-supporting relationships, and inevita-
bly someone will make the claim that functional combatant commands should
always support regional combatant commands. Implied, if not stated, is the be-
lief that conducting operations or executing missions is the sole purview of re-
gional combatant commands and that no functional combatant command
should conduct operations in a regional combatant commander’s AOR. Such
hard-and-fast rules have never existed, and supported-supporting relationships con-
tinue to depend on the situation and mission objectives. That is why supported-
supporting relationships are spelled out in planning orders, deployment orders,
execution orders, in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and in operations plans
and concept plans. Moreover, the term “supported” does not imply sole re-
sponsibility for execution. A supporting combatant commander can execute
or conduct operations in support of the supported commander—something
USTRANSCOM does every day. Our combatant commanders ultimately sup-
port the president and the secretary of defense in the pursuit of American secu-
rity, and the array of possible command relations between combatant
commanders should not be constrained unnecessarily. To the extent we can harness
the ability to observe and operate globally, without self-imposed artificial limi-
tations, we will generate new military capabilities to add to the ones that we have
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today, thereby yielding a greater number of military options from which the
president can choose.
The president and secretary of defense must maintain a global perspective,
and so must the military officials charged with supporting them. While commu-
nications from the president and the secretary of defense to the combatant com-
manders normally pass through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Joint Chiefs and the chairman are not in the chain of command. If there was ever
a time when our nation’s security could be adequately provided by having uni-
formed leaders in Washington maintain a global perspective while commands
around the globe kept exclusive focus on their regions, that time has long since
passed into history. To fulfill faithfully the “commander’s intent” from the presi-
dent on down, combatant command staffs, service staffs, the Joint Staff, and U.S.
officials serving on allied staffs must appreciate our commander in chief ’s per-
spective—a global perspective. If we attempt to do otherwise, we will surely end
up like the six blind men of the ancient Eastern parable in their first encounter
with an elephant, endlessly disputing the nature of something we fail to perceive
fully. By shifting our view from a regional perspective to a global perspective, we
will better comprehend and respond to America’s security needs in the
twenty-first century.
NOTE S
1. Joint History Office, The History of the Unified
Command Plan 1946–1993 (Washington, D.C.:
Joint History Office, 1995), pp. 11–15.
2. General Douglas MacArthur, speech before
Congress, 19 April 1951, reproduced in
Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), p. 459; General
Omar Bradley, testimony to Congress, 15
May 1951, cited in Omar N. Bradley and Clay
Blair, A General’s Life (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1983), p. 640.
3. Prior to the formation of USSPACECOM in
1985, purely functional combatant commands
tended to be “specified commands,” meaning
that all of their forces came from a single ser-
vice. Strategic Air Command was an example
of a specified command. The last specified
command, USFORSCOM, became the Army
component to U.S. Atlantic Command in
1993. (U.S. Atlantic Command became
USJFCOM in 1999.)
4. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld,
transcript of a Defense Department press
conference, The Pentagon, Washington,
D.C., 7 January 2003.
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